The Battle of Surnames: A Game-Theory Analysis of the Colombian Legal Rules Allowing Parents to Choose their Children’s Surnames
La batalla de los apellidos: un análisis bajo teoría de juegos de las normas colombianas que permiten a los padres elegir el orden de los apellidos de sus hijos
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Abstract
Colombian law used to provide that parents had to register children with their fathers’ last names as the first one. In November 2019, Colombian Constitutional Court held that such rule was against the equal treatment of genders, allowing parents to register a child either with the father’s or the mother’s surname. This research, based on a game-theoretical approach as well as on models of the economic analysis of family law, applies such notions, lege lata, to the new rules allowing parents to bargain over property rights on their children’s last names, focusing on married parents or in those who live together under similar arrangements. The paper also models such bargaining as both a battle of the sexes and a chicken game. Such approach offers new insights not only as to new case law’s effects but also, and more generally, regarding the economic analysis of marriage and other family law issues. The text concludes that the bargaining over children’s last names may be very complex not due to legal reasons but because of economic grounds such as a bilateral monopoly between parents and the fact that a last name is an indivisible object that is not traded in a traditional market.
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Un abogado logra que el TS reconozca que su apellido materno en extinción es un “bien a proteger”, La Razón, España, 18 de octubre de 2021. Disponible en: https://www.larazon.es/espana/20211018/p27xwnmfhrauzn5uuovk32xo4y.html
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